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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
The court in a very well written opinion delivered by Mr. Justice
Pitney decided that bankruptcy petitions, whether voluntary or involuntary, re-
sulting in an adjudicxtion of bankruptcy are the equivalent of an anticipatory
breach of an execatory contract so as to entitle the promisee to prove his claim
in the bankruptcy proceedings.
CONTRACT-BUILDING CONTRACT-LANGUAGE TO BE CON-
STRUED IN ITS PLAIN ORDINARY MEANING.
In the case of Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store Co. v. Barton, 232 S. W.
1088, (Mo.) involving the construction of a lease a decision is handed down by the
Springfield Court of Appeals contrary to the view take by the St. Louis Court
of Appeals on the same point. In that case a Mrs. Knight leased a lot in
Poplar Bluff, Missouri, to plaintiff for sixteen years, nine months and eight
days at $40.00 per month plus general and special taxes. Later defendant pur-
chased the lot from Mrs. Knight thus becoming responsible under the lease
contract as she had befi. Plaintiff erected a building on said leased lot and
occupied the same under the contract until the expiration of the lease. It was
for the value of this building, as limited by the lease contract for which this
suit was brought.
The provision of the lease upon which plaintiff relied was to the effect
that any buildings or improvements placed on said leased premises were to re-
main its property, and at expiration of lease may be sold to person own-
ing lot (present defendant) if parties could agree upon the amount. If not,
then the plaintiff is to have the right (1) to remove property from premises (2)
to sell to some other person or (3) to release anew upon agreeable terms.
Plaintiff construed this to mean that if he at the expiration of the lease elected
to sell to defendant, defendant would be compelled to buy the improvements.
In the case of Knight v. Orchard, 92 Mo. App. 466, in which a provision
similar to above was contained in a lease the St. Louis Court of Appeals used
language which would seem to support plaintiff's contention in the case at bar.
While it did not directly hold that defendant is bound to buy regardless of his
wishes some such principle must havd been in mind from the conclusion arrived
at in the case. This decision did not, however, affect the decision in the case
at bar for akho the plaintiff recovered in the court below, the Springfield Court
of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that there was no absolute obligation on
the lessor's successor to take and pay for the buildings at the lessee's electicn.
In the construction of a contract all of its provisions must be considered
together and not mere fragmentary parts. The true intention of a contract is
expressed by every term or provision so construed as to be consistent with
every other part. 2 Elliott on Contracts, Sees. 1514 and 1510. It is ordinarily
presumed that the intention of the parties is -expreased by the words of the
whole contract and the court cannot inportl words into a contract which would
make it materially different in a vital particular from what it is. In Haysler
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v. Owen, 60 Mo. 270, the general proposition is found that "Courts have no
rights to make contracts for the parties, and they cannot compel a man to pay
for a building for which he did not contract and which he does not want. and
which he would rather have removed from his premises." In Roy v. Boteler,
40 Mo. App. 213, we find the statement that the language of a building contract
is to be taken in its plain ordinary meaning, and such an interpretation given
as fairly appears to havq been intended. Considering the language in this lease
in its plain ordinary meaning it cannot be seen how the plaintiff hoped to re-
cover upon the particular part of the lease set forth by him. The decision of
the Springfield Court of Appeals seems more in keeping with sound legal prin-
ciples.
CORPORATIONS-LACHES, AS APPLIED TO.
In the recent case of Virginia C. Mining, Milling and Smelting Co. v. Clay-
ton, 233 S. W. 215 (Mo.) it was held that an officer of the mining company could
invoke the doctrine of laches against the corporation which was seeking to enjoin
ing to enjoin him from disposing of certain stock held by him as security
for a loan he had made to the company, even tho.the loan were validly ne-
gotiated by officers of the company.
The plaintiff was a mining company with mines in Mexico and incorporated
under the laws of that country; but had its general offices in St. Louis. The
company, soon after incorporation being in need of money, pledged six of its
ten shares of capital stock with the defendant Clayton, who was an officer of
the company, as security for a loan from him. The loan was not paid at matur-
ity and the defendant took possession of the six shares in accordance with the
agreement. Up to the time Clayton took control the enterprise had not been a
paying one; but he soon had it on a firm basis and was shortly able to declare
a dixidend. The plaintiff corporation, acting thru its board of directors, then
brought this action to recover the capital stock held by the defendant.
It was admitted that the loan had been negotiated by one Chews, president
facts, i. e., (1) As to the ratification of the pledge, and (2) as to the conduct
of the plaintiff, without authority from the board of directors and that the
board had never ratified his action, altho the defendant was permitted to act
and spend money in tlbe interest of the company as tho he were the rightful
owner of the six shares. It was also admitted that under the Mexican law it
was necessary to comply with certain formalities and procedures in order to
pass a valid title to the stock and that these procedures had not been followed.
The court held that the doctrine of laches was dependent upon two lines of
facts, i. e. (1) As to the ratification of the pledge, and (2) as to the conduct
of the plaintiff after the defendant obtained the shares. The court points out
that there was sufficient evidence to justify the finding that the directors had
impliedly ratified the pledge, and as to number two; the company was guilty
of such laches in its relations with the defendant that the latter could properly
invoke the doctrine of laches.
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